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COpy
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
ACORN DEVELOPMENT, LLC
ROBERT STEWART, AND
DENISE STEWART
Plaintiffs,

)

)
)
)
)

~)

v.

Civil Action No. 2007-CV-135511

CJ KELLEY LLC, KELLEY DEVELOPMENT)
CORPORATION, MORGAN FINANCIAL,
)
LLC, GEORGE O'NEAL, TERESA CURTIS, )
)
____~D~e=f=en~d=a=n=t.~________________)
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On January 9,2008, counsel in the above-styled action appeared before the
Court to present oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Morgan Financial, LLC. Upon request
and with leave of the Court, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental brief on February 25,
2008. After reviewing the record of the case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and
the arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background:
This case involves a condo conversation investment scheme in The Reserve of
Dunwoody Condominiums (the "Reserve"). CJ Kelley, LLC ("CJ Kelley") purchased an
apartment complex to be converted into the Reserve. CJ Kelley then sold individual
units to investors over market value and pooled the excess money in order to renovate
and convert the property into condominiums with the stated purpose of selling the units
at a profit.

Plaintiff Acorn Development purchased a total of thirteen units beginning in
January 2006. The Stewarts purchased eight units in May 2006. Plaintiffs own their
units in fee simple.
To complete the transactions, Plaintiffs signed sales contracts, management
agreements, and powers of attorney which gave CJ Kelley the authority to lease the
units purchased by investors, to collect rents from them, and to sell the units to third
parties. Under the terms of the agreements, CJ Kelley was to be paid a management
fee for the services performed on the property.
Joanne Morgan is the principal of Morgan Financial, LLC ("Morgan"), which
became the managing member of CJ Kelley sometime between May and July of 2006.
On April 5, 2006, CJ Kelley assigned its purchase and sale agreement on the Reserve
to Morgan, effective July 15, 2006. Per Morgan's instructions, however, the excess
purchase price amounts on units sold in May and June were directed to Morgan's bank
accounts. Joanne Morgan, acting for Morgan Financial, first communicated with
Plaintiffs and other CJ Kelley investors on July 30, 2006, informing them that, effective
July 1, 2006, Morgan had assumed management of CJ Kelley and the Reserve.
Morgan continues to act as the sole Manager-member of CJ Kelley and as the
project-manager of the Reserve. Morgan Financial has collected rents on the units, but
has not accounted for the proceeds. The parties disagree about whether or not this is
allowed under the terms of the management agreements.
George O'Neal was the principal of CJ Kelley and the initial investment solicitor.
Neither he nor Ms. Curtis have been served with the Complaint in this matter. Mr.
O'Neal has been absent from this proceeding and is alleged by Plaintiffs to be "missing"
since June or July of 2006.
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CJ Kelley filed an answer in this action, but then filed a bankruptcy petition on
December 26,2007.

Automatic Bankruptcy Stay:
Because CJ Kelley has filed a bankruptcy petition, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
362(a), CJ Kelley is entitled to an automatic stay of this proceeding as it relates to the
corporation. Harkleroad & Hermance, P.C. v. Stringer, 220 Ga. App. 906, 907 (1996).
A stay as to one co-defendant, however, does not automatically stay the proceeding
with regard to other codefendants who may be jointly and severably liable to plaintiffs.
Paul v. Joseph, 212 Ga. App. 122 (1994). Thus, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment with regard to CJ Kelley is stayed pending resolution of the bankruptcy
action.

Defendant Morgan's Motion For Summary Judgment:
Members of limited liability corporations are generally not subject to personal
liability. See Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 449 (2006).
Morgan seeks summary judgment on all claims asserted against it because it was
acting, and continues to act, solely in its capacity as the Manager-member of CJ Kelley,
and therefore, is protected by limited liability. See O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305(b).
Exceptions to the general liability prohibition exist where the corporate veil is pierced, in
derivative actions, and in some instances of fraud. "An LLC member may be held
individually liable if he or she personally participates or cooperates in a tort committed
by the LLC or directs it to be done." Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc.! 280 Ga.
App. 449, 454 (citing BTL COM v. Vachon" 278 Ga. App. 256, 260(1) (2006)).
Here, Plaintiffs produced the assignments between Morgan and CJ Kelley that
indicate a role in the alleged activities beyond that of a mere Member-manager.
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Additionally, Plaintiffs introduced a wiring instruction letter directing purchase price
proceeds to Morgan's bank account before the purported installment of Morgan as the
Member-manager of CJ Kelley. Additionally, Plaintiffs presented the Court with
Morgan's 30(b)(6) deposition testimony that Morgan has collected rents, has not
accounted for or segregated rents, failed to pay certain mortgage payments, and took a
series of actions with regard to the Reserve. These actions-if they are found to be
tortious, which is not before the Court at this stage-present questions of fact regarding
Morgan's potential liability.
Accordingly, Defendant Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on its RICO claims against Morgan. Plaintiffs
allege that CJ Kelley's offering of the condo conversion investment constituted a sale of
unregistered securities in violation of Georgia law, which formed a predicate act under
the Georgia RICO statutes. Mosely v. State, 253 Ga. App. 710,712 (2002). Plaintiffs
allege that Morgan's involvement with the securities sale as the assignee under the
purchase agreements and, later, as the Manager-member constituted a pattern of
racketeering activity which utilized proceeds from a predicate act (e.g., the investment).
Plaintiffs argue that the condo investment qualifies as a "security" because it
involves (1) a money investment, (2) a common enterprise, (3) was entered into with an
expectation of profit solely derived from the efforts of a third party, and (4) materially
restricted the owner's occupancy or rental of his unit. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-2(26); Eberhardt
v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578 (11th Cir. 1990); 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-75, p. 129. Such
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a security, if sold without proper registration or authorization, is a violation of Georgia's
Security Act and may be a predicate act under the RICO statutes.
Under O.C.G.A. § 10-5-2-(26) a "security" includes an investment contract which
"holds out the possibility of return on risk capital even though the investor's efforts are
necessary to receive such return ... [s]uch return is dependent upon essential
managerial or sales efforts of the issuer or its affiliates." Id. Under Georgia law, the
definition of a "security" is interpreted broadly. Gilbert v. Meason, 137 Ga. App. 1,3
(1975) ("state security laws are an expression by the General Assembly of a statutory
policy affording broad protection to investors and are remedial in nature and should be
liberally construed ... "); S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 US 293 (1946). Real estate
investment contracts will be considered a security if the investor's return is essentially
dependent upon the efforts of the syndicator. Fortier v. Ramsey, 136 Ga. App. 203, 205
(1975); Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Eleventh Circuit in Eberhardt adopted the Supreme Court's test in Howey to
determine an investment from a traditional security which looked at three factors: (1)
money investment, (2) common enterprise, and (3) expectation of profit solely
dependent upon efforts of others. Eberhardt v. Waters 901 F.2d 1578, 15801581 (11 th Cir. 1990). A common enterprise is found where the investors have "no
desire to perform the chores necessary for a return, and are attracted to the investment
solely by the prospects of a return."

19..

Here, Plaintiffs presented evidence that they invested money into the Reserve by
purchasing units in fee simple at a price over market value. They also directed the
Court to the management and leasing agreement and powers of attorney to establish
that CJ Kelley/Morgan had virtually unfettered control over the property itself and the
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profits to be made on the investment. Plaintiffs allege that they have been restricted
from accessing their units, but there is some dispute in the record regarding this point.
Regardless, the centralized management and aggregation of profits and losses on the
individual units restrict Plaintiffs' ability to exercise their ownership rights over their units.
The weight of the evidence supports the finding that the investment in the
Reserve constituted a security under O.C.G.A. § 10-5- et seq. Such sales, if
unregistered, may form the basis of a predicate act under Georgia RICO Act §§16-144(a) and 16-14-4(c). See Mosley v. State, 253 Ga. App. 710, 712 (2002).
What is unclear, however, is the distinction between Morgan's independent role
in the transaction, if any, and its protected role as a Manager-member of CJ Kelley as it
relates to the sale of the Reserve units and their management. The Court has long
recognized that that "great caution should be exercised by the court in disregarding the
corporate entity." Old Nat. Villages, LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, __ S.E.2d _ _ , 2008
WL 768097*3 (Ga.App. March 25, 2008) (citing Yukon Partners v. Lodge Keeper Group,
258 Ga.App. 1, 5-6 (2002». In light of the questions that remain regarding whether or
not Morgan should face liability, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is premature
and hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED this

"3 I

day of M<:V\~, 2008.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Thomas M. Barton, Esq.
William V. Hearnburg, Jr., Esq.
SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
Suite 3100
1230 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309-3592
(404) 815-3679
Attorneys for Defendants
Richard Alembik, Esq. (Morgan Financial LLC)
RICHARD S. ALEMBIK, PC
315 W. Ponce De Leon Ave.
St. 250
Decatur, GA 30030
(404) 373-0205
Villard Bastien, Esq. (CJ Kelley LLC)
LAW OFFICES OF VILLARD BASTIEN
910 Church Street, Suite 110
Decatur, GA 30030
(404) 378-4344
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